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"Science" plays a central role in litigation today. Civil litigants 
spend hours briefing and arguing the value of expert testimony. Stud­
ies performed years previously are taken apart and evaluated in de­
tail. Criminal defendants are convicted or exonerated based on DNA 
evidence. And all of the evidence comes in through expert testimony, 
from witnesses who seek to explain the scientific issues to a lay jury, 
often in the form of opinion testimony.1 This testimony can, and often 
does, dictate the outcome of cases. 
Courts wrestle with the admissibility and use of scientific evidence 
every day, and have developed an evolving set of standards to apply to 
those decisions. They are seeking, at least in part, to have legal fact-
finders consider only evidence that has already been deemed reliable 
in science-in other words, to have law follow science. The most re­
cent iteration of the standards adopted to further those goals started, 
of course, with Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals.2 With that 
case and throughout the cases that followed, courts have sought to use 
science's paradigms of"reliability" as the standards of admissibility. If 
the scientific community has approved of the methods or conclusions 
(through peer-reviewed publication and other criteria), the courts con­
clude that those methods or conclusions should be admitted. The 
1. 	 While I focus on "scientific" evidence, most of the Article is equally applicable to 
all forms of expert testimony that have a foundation in traditional academic re­
search. I intentionally leave "science" undefined, especially given the fact that 
my arguments are not limited to any particular area of study. Additionally, cre­
ating a satisfactory definition would be difficult, to say the least. One that may 
be helpful for these purposes is the following: "Science is not an encyclopedic body 
of knowledge about the universe. Instead, it represents a process for proposing 
and refining theoretical explanations about the world that are subject to further 
testing and refinement." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. (Daubert1), 509 U.S. 
579, 590 (1993) (quoting Brief for American Association for the Advancement of 
Science et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 7-8). 
2. 	 Daubert1, 509 U.S. 579. Many gallons of ink have been spilled on Daubertand 
its progeny, and I make no effort to summarize all of them here. 
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courts (and many commentators) believe that making legal standards 
track the perceived scientific standards improves the quality of fact­
finding-that scientists' standards of reliability should be courts' stan­
dards of reliability. 
In making this Daubertshift-more closely linking admissibility to 
scientific standards of reliability-the courts paid little attention, if 
any, to the potential impact making such a shift could have on science 
itself, or how it could affect the nature and quality of the scientific 
evidence being presented to fact-finders, usually a jury. In this Arti­
cle, the first in a broader project in law and science, I explore two un­
expected consequences of joining science and law at the hip, and 
consider whether these consequences represent reciprocal contamina­
tion, or instead cross-fertilization, of law and science. 3 
In the first unexpected consequence, the reliance (perhaps overre­
liance) on peer-reviewed publication in admissibility decisionmaking 
has resulted in aggressive litigation discovery into the peer-review 
process. Documents from the peer-review process have been subpoe­
naed and the participants in that process have been deposed, all with 
an eye to undermining the perceived value of the peer-review process, 
and, possibly, to purposefully deterring the future involvement in that 
very process by researchers and reviewers. This discovery was de­
scribed in one instance as "'harassment to silence independent re­
search' and an effort to create 'a chilling effect on folks who tell the 
truth."'4 Under this view, letting lawyers into the citadel of science in 
this way could weaken science's ability to assist the legal fact-finding 
process and to assist society more generally, by creating disincentives 
for scholars to participate in the peer-review process or to be fully hon­
est in that process. These disincentives may be created whether or not 
the litigants intend them. 
In the second unexpected consequence, the focus on following sci­
ence's paradigms (again most notably peer review) has resulted in 
what can be called "litigation-driven scholarship." Some expert wit­
nesses have performed litigation-related research and essentially sub­
mitted their expert reports to peer-reviewed journals in what appears 
to be, at least in part, an attempt to bolster the likelihood of their 
testimony being admitted.5 These efforts may cheapen the value of 
3. 	 By "cross-fertilization" I refer to the agricultural concept (also called allogamy) of 
crossing a male from one species and a female from another. In the same way 
that crossing gametes in plants can create a disease-resistant plant or crossing 
an Angus bull with a Hereford cow can result in a faster-growing calf than a 
purebred calf of either species, I argue below that the interchange between law 
and science can strengthen both. 
4. 	 Jon Wiener, Cancer,Chemicals andHistory: CompaniesAre UsingNew Tacticsto 
Insure Their Misdeeds Aren't Revealed in Court, NATION, Feb. 7, 2005, at 19. 
5. 	 Conversely, and importantly, some researchers who first become scholars on a 
subject later are recruited as litigation experts. Of course, the lag time between 
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the paradigmatic reliability indicators in science and decrease the 
quality of scholarship presented to fact-finders (and to consumers of 
scholarship), reversing one core idea of the shift-that law should fol­
low science, rather than the reverse. Many observers find such schol­
arship unseemly, if not outright untrustworthy, due to the obvious 
potential for bias.6 
This Article explores the conflicts I conclude are inevitable in ef­
forts to join law and science together. The two disciplines' magisteria 
7 
overlap, but not precisely, and that lack of fit creates problems and 
opportunities for both. I conclude that it is far from self-evident that 
the "contamination" of science by law (e.g., lawyers meddling in peer 
review) or of law by science (e.g., litigation-driven scholarship showing 
up in litigation) necessarily weakens either science or law. Instead, 
they may serve as a check on each other and on other potential 
problems. 
In fact, the reciprocal line-crossing-of litigators into the peer-re­
view process, and of litigation experts into the peer-reviewed scholar­
ship-may make both law and science stronger and provide a better 
understanding of both. A complete understanding and exploration of 
the peer-review process by litigants and the court would improve both 
law and science. Thus, rather than contamination, such interactions 
should be considered as cross-fertilization, strengthening both. The 
complex interplay between these overlapping and competing magis­
teria may cause discomfort and (hopefully transient) confusion, but it 
should be cautiously welcomed, not avoided. 
I proceed in four parts. First, in Part I, I provide a brief review of 
the evolution of legal standards for the admissibility of what is termed 
"scientific evidence," including Frye and Daubert and their progeny. I 
also explore the stated and unstated goals of the shift from Frye's fo­
research being completed and the review and publication process being completed 
can undermine either effort, but, especially in major litigation, the lag is not so 
great as to preclude it. See infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
6. 	 See, e.g., Peter F. Infante, The Past Suppression of Industry Knowledge of the 
Toxicity ofBenzene to Humans and PotentialBias in FutureBenzene Research, 12 
INT'L J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 268 (2006) (criticizing industry research 
into benzene toxicity as biased). Of note, the author, Peter Infante, is a frequent 
litigation expert witness for plaintiffs in benzene litigation; that affiliation is not 
disclosed in the article. See Bette Hileman, Daubert Rules Challenge Courts, 
CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Jul. 7, 2003, at 14 (noting Infante's work as a 
paid expert). 
7. 	 "Magisteria" is a term for the teaching authority of a particular area of inquiry­
"a word derived not from any concept of majesty or awe but from the different 
notion of teaching, for magister is Latin for 'teacher.'" Steven Jay Gould, Non-
overlapping Magisteria, 106 NAT. HIST. 16, 19 (1997). One can think of magis­
teria as areas of authority-the relevant subject areas of disciplines. Gould used 
the term in an essay about the purported conflicts between evolution and relig­
ious belief, concluding that religion and science need not have overlapping magis­
teria and thus that religion and science can coexist. See id. 
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cus on the "general acceptance" of the expert's approach to Daubert's 
emphasis on the reliability and relevancy of the expert's methodology. 
Second, I give a (necessarily limited) overview of certain modern 
scientific paradigms of reliability. In Part II, I explore the realities of 
peer reviews and of other institutions in science that are relied upon 
in evidentiary determinations. Among other things, I explore the his­
tory of peer review in science and establish that only relatively re­
cently did peer review become a central aspect of general scientific 
scholarship. Further, I conclude that the factors judges and litigators 
see as binary-for example, either the method is peer reviewed or it is 
not-are not nearly so simple to resolve. That Part, among other 
things, includes examples of exactly what peer reviewers are asked to 
do from various journals, duties that can vary significantly. Put more 
bluntly, there is peer review, and then there is peer review-and even 
careful and thorough peer review can miss fraud, as recent high-pro­
file cases have shown. This conclusion will be important in evaluating 
whether the unexpected consequences of Daubert are problematic. 
Third, in Part III, I describe two phenomena (summarized above) 
that are, to my knowledge, relatively new, and are almost certainly 
the direct result of courts' emphasis on peer review as a criterion for 
the admission of expert testimony. The first phenomenon is discovery 
in litigation into the peer-review process-document and testimonial 
discovery exploring and challenging the peer-review process with the 
purpose of undermining the admissibility of testimony relying on the 
reviewed publication. The prospect of being put through such discov­
ery may create incentives for scientists to refuse to participate in such 
a process; it may weaken the honesty of the comments provided in 
that process; it may be used to intimidate other potential experts; and 
it may impinge upon academic freedom. At the same time, it may pro­
vide valuable and relevant evidence of the reliability of the methods 
and conclusions in the publication and educate the courts about the 
nature of peer review. 
The second phenomenon discussed in Part III is related: scholar­
ship that appears to be produced (and submitted to peer-reviewed 
8. Here, and throughout the Article, I focus on editorialpeer review-that is, the 
review that takes place as part of publication decisions. The ongoing evaluation 
of scientific research by others, publications of challenging counterpoints, and so 
on all constitute what some commentators identify as "true peer review." See 
Effie J. Chan, Note, The "BraveNew World" of Daubert: True PeerReview, Edito­
rialPeerReview, and Scientific Validity, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 100, 100 (1995). Some 
courts, too, recognize this broader (and perhaps more important) concept of peer 
review. See infra note 39. Arguably, there are two levels of peer review prior to 
editorial peer review: what could be called "local peer review" (intra- and inter­
institutional informal discussions, for example) and "editor peer review" (the 
first-cut determination by a journal editor). Daubert,however, put the focus on 
editorial peer review and the phenomena I discuss are in that area as well. 
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publications), at least in part, to increase the odds of the authors' opin­
ions being admitted in litigation. This bootstrapping may result in 
published work that would not otherwise be published-and perhaps 
should not, under some standards, be published. And indeed, some 
research motivated by litigation may never be performed at all in the 
absence of litigation. Research may be published too soon (or sooner 
than it otherwise would have been) because the litigation schedule as­
sociated with the research is more time-pressured than the scientific 
community's. Science works incrementally; lawyers (especially those 
on a contingent fee) have every reason to work fast; statutes of limita­
tions, the time value of money, and the ethical obligation to represent 
one's client zealously all work together to make a litigation timeline 
much shorter than a pure research timeline might be. This incentive 
to create scholarship may result in the publication of whole new areas 
of purported expertise that have not previously been published and 
that may not genuinely be proper subjects of expert testimony-scien­
tists opining about the ethics of defendants, for example. 
Finally, in Part IV, I explore the likely ultimate consequences of 
the development of discovery into peer review and litigation-driven 
scholarship and conclude that they are not so bad after all. The phe­
nomena are especially acceptable if they both occur, as they work to 
balance each other; though I do not limit my conclusions to the situa­
tion in which both take place. In both contexts, I provide safeguards 
that courts, authors, and journals could adopt to mitigate the poten­
tial harm of both litigation-driven scholarship and peer-review 
discovery. 
As for litigants taking discovery into the peer-review process, what 
is meant by "peer review" varies widely, and it is sensible to permit 
litigants to explore the quality of the peer review involved when its 
conclusions are being used against them. That process will better ed­
ucate the courts about how much reliance to place on peer review as 
an indicator for reliability, much in the way that Dauberthas edu­
cated judges about science and its methods more generally. Further, 
discovery into peer review can provide a rough analogue to what is 
called post-publication peer review, and that can only help, rather 
than hurt, the continued development of reliable knowledge in both 
science and law. The concerns about disincentives to participants in 
that process are not trivial, but they are relatively minor and can be 
mitigated relatively inexpensively and without undercutting the criti­
cal features of peer-reviewed scholarship. My conclusions are strong­
est in the context where the peer-reviewed author is acting as a 
litigation expert, but are not limited to that context. 
Similarly, while there is something unseemly about articles pub­
lished by litigation experts with an intention to assist the litigants, 
there are sufficient gatekeepers in place to conclude that such scholar­
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ship is not inherently bad.9 Between peer review itself, strong disclo­
sure requirements (which I contend should be made stronger, 
including a requirement that litigation-driven scholarship authors 
disclose their payments for litigation work), and the availability of dis­
covery into the process, the potential negative impact of that scholar­
ship is minimized. Further, the resources that litigants can bring to 
bear-especially in mass tort cases, which for economic reasons are 
the sort of cases where these events tend to arise-may result in im­
portant research being performed that otherwise would be performed 
later or never. The fact that litigants are funding such work is un­
doubtedly important in its evaluation (and, again, mitigates in favor of 
permitting discovery into the publication process), but that fact should 
not, by itself, make the scholarship either unpublishable in journals or 
inadmissible in court, especially when comparable bias is present in 
many articles that are admitted without a fight. 
I. FROM FRYE TO DAUBERT, KUMHO TIRE, AND BEYOND:
 
A FOCUS ON METHODS, NOT QUALIFICATIONS
 
It is nearly automatic for lawyers, judges, and commentators to 
blurt out "gatekeeper!" any time Daubert is mentioned. Indeed, the 
case emphasizes the importance of judges preventing unreliable ex­
pert testimony from being heard by the jury, and has by most accounts 
increased the scrutiny given to proffered expert testimony.10 
Prior to Daubert(and still present in states in which Daubertor its 
equivalent has not been adopted), the prevailing standard was the
"general acceptance" standard ofFrye v. United States.II Frye, taking 
up less than two pages in the FederalReporter,evaluated the admissi­
bility of expert testimony regarding an early lie detector test in a crim­
inal trial. The court, after briefly summarizing the theory underlying 
the test,12 concluded that testimony based on that theory could not be 
admitted: 
9. 	 And the unseemliness may be no greater than when the research is performed 
specifically to support the approval and marketing of a drug, for instance. That 
said, my perception is that most attorneys and scientists are more uncomfortable 
with litigation-driven scholarship than with, for example, clinical trials spon­
sored by a drug maker, though that discomfort may be a function of a lack of 
familiarity. While research for approval or marketing purposes has existed for 
years, litigation-driven scholarship is clearly newer. 
10. 	 See, e.g., D. Alan Rudlin, The Judge as Gatekeeper: What Hath 
Daubert-Joiner-Kumho Wrought?, 29 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) 329, 
329-36 (2001). This more exacting examination has occurred despite the Court's 
references to the opinion reflecting a "liberalizing" of standards. See infra note 15 
and accompanying text. 
11. 	 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
12. 	 "[T]he theory seems to be that truth is spontaneous, and comes without conscious 
effort, while the utterance of a falsehood requires a conscious effort, which is re­
flected in the blood pressure." Id. at 1014. 
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Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the ex­
perimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this 
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and 
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a 
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thingfrom which the de­
duction is made must be sufficiently establishedto have gainedgeneral accept­
ance in the particularfield in which it belongs. 
1 3 
Thus, Frye's focus is on the general acceptance of the expert's prin­
ciple by those in the expert's field of inquiry, along with the basic re­
quirement that the expert be generally qualified to speak about the 
subject. 
In 1993, the Supreme Court considered the proper restrictions on 
expert testimony given the adoption of the FederalRules of Evidence 
[hereinafter FederalRules], concluding first that the rules superseded 
Frye.14 In reaching that conclusion, the Court noted that Frye's "rigid
'general acceptance' requirement would be at odds with the 'liberal 
thrust' of the Federal Rules and their 'general approach of relaxing 
the traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony.'" 15 Parsing the lan­
guage of Rule 702 of the FederalRules, the Court concluded that the 
expert's testimony must be "scientific" and relate to "scientific knowl­
edge," which "implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of 
science" and "connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported 
speculation."16 
Based on that interpretation of the FederalRules, Daubertfocuses 
trial courts more precisely on the expert's methodology rather than 
the acceptance of the expert's more general field of work.1
7 Most im­
portant for purposes of this Article, Daubertenumerates nonexclusive 
criteria for consideration relevant to reliability: testability,1 8 peer re-
view,19 error rate, 20 control standards, and (echoing Frye) general ac­
13. 	 Id. (emphasis added). 
14. 	 See DaubertI, 509 U.S. 579, 585-89 (1993). 
15. 	 Id. at 588 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)). 
16. 	 Id. at 589-90. The case also addresses further the issues of qualification and fit, 
but those discussions are not directly relevant to the subject of this Article. 
17. 	 See id. at 592-93. 
18. 	 "Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether a theory or 
technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether 
it can be (and has been) tested." Id. at 593. 
19. 	 "The fact of publication (or lack thereof) in a peer reviewed journal thus will be a 
relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in assessing the scientific validity 
of a particular technique or methodology on which an opinion is premised." Id. at 
594. 
20. 	 "[In the case of a particular scientific technique, the court ordinarily should con­
sider the known or potential rate of error . . . ." Id. 
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ceptance. 2 1 These factors were drawn in large part from an effort to 
define "scientific" in the ways that the Court believed scientists did.22 
The post-Daubert amendment to Rule 702 and its official com­
ments expressly incorporated those criteria and added several more: 
whether the expert's work is litigation-specific, whether the expert is 
unjustifiably extrapolating to an improper conclusion, whether the ex­
pert has accounted for alternative explanations, whether the expert's 
work is as cautious in litigation as it would be in ordinary work, and 
whether the expert's claimed field of expertise is known for reaching 
reliable results. 2 3 What "reliable" means in connection with method­
ology can vary, of course-a proper method to measure the tempera­
ture of a liquid is presumably a fairly precise question, while the 
proper method to evaluate the likelihood of user confusion in the face 
of a particular drug label may be more nebulous. 
Since Daubert, the Supreme Court has established that the stan­
dard of review of district court decisions is abuse of discretion 24 and 
established that the Daubert approach is to be used in all expert testi­
mony evaluation, not just what might traditionally be called 
"science."25 
Consider for a moment the criteria adopted by Daubert and de­
scribed in the comments to Rule 702, and take note of the wiggle room 
present in virtually every one: 
* 	 Testability: "whether the expert's technique or theory can be or has 
been tested-that is, whether the expert's theory can be chal­
lenged in some objective sense, or whether it is instead simply a 
subjective, conclusory approach that cannot reasonably be as­
sessed for reliability";2 6 
" Peer review: "whether the technique or theory has been subjected 
to peer review and publication; 2 7 
* 	 Errorrate:"the known or potential rate of error of the technique or 
theory when applied";28 
21. 	 "Widespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence 
admissible, and 'a known technique which has been able to attract only minimal 
support within the community'... may properly be viewed with skepticism." Id. 
(quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
22. 	 See id. at 592-94. 
23. 	See FED. R. EVID.702. David Bernstein has argued that the adoption of Rule 702 
superseded Daubert. See, e.g., Posting of David Bernstein to the Volokh Conspir­
acy, http://volokh.com/posts/chain_1147021015.shtml (May 6, 2006, 09:29 PDT). 
Such a conclusion does not conflict with my arguments. 
24. 	 See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
25. 	 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
26. 	 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note to the 2000 amendment. 
27. 	 Id. 
28. 	 Id. 
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* 	 Control standards:"the existence and maintenance of standards 
and controls";2
9 
* 	 General acceptance: "whether the technique or theory has been 
generally accepted in the scientific community";
30 
" 	 Litigation-based:"Whether experts are 'proposing to testify about 
matters growing naturally and directly out of research they have 
conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have de­
veloped their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying"';
3 1 
" Extrapolation:"Whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated 
from an accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion."32 
" Alternative explanations:"Whether the expert has adequately ac­
counted for obvious alternative explanations."33 
* 	 Level of care: "Whether the expert 'is being as careful as he would 
be in his regular professional work outside his paid litigation 
consulting."' 
34 
" 	 Reliabilityof field: "Whether the field of expertise claimed by the 
expert is known to reach reliable results for the type of opinion the 
expert would give."3 
5 
The only one of the bunch that at least seems binary-i.e., it is 
either there or it is not-is peer review. Its presence can be deter­
mined with a single yes-or-no question: "Has the methodology you are 
following been subjected to peer review?" (And, as discussed below, if 
the expert can say, "Yes, and my conclusion on this very issue has 
been peer reviewed too," so much the better.) Given the apparent ease 
of evaluating it as a factor, litigants and courts tend to focus on peer 
review, if not to the exclusion of other factors, at least more heavily 
than Daubertand the drafters of Rule 702 might have intended.3 6 Put 
29. 	 Id. 
30. 	 Id. 
31. 	 Id. (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 
1995)). 
32. 	 FED. R. EVID.702 advisory committee's note to the 2000 amendment (citing Gen­
eral Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)). 
33. 	 Id. (citing Claar v. Burlington N. R.R., 29 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
34. 	 Id. (quoting Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 
1997)). 
35. 	 Id. (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999)). This factor 
is relevant when the purported discipline itself lacks reliability-for example,
"astrology or necromancy." Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 151. 
36. 	 The DaubertI Court itself was rather cautious in describing peer review's value, 
which suggests that courts that rely on peer review to the exclusion of other fac­
tors may do so contrary to the Court's intentions. 
Publication (which is but one element of peer review) is not a sine qua 
non of admissibility; it does not necessarily correlate with reliability.... 
and in some instances well-grounded but innovative theories will not 
have been published .... Some propositions, moreover, are too particu­
lar, too new, or of too limited interest to be published. But submission to 
the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of 'good science,' 
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another way, in considering the panoply of criteria in play, courts 
might be expected to latch onto peer review as an easy one to consider. 
And indeed, that is what has happened, at least in some cases. 
One need go no further than the Ninth Circuit's consideration of 
the remanded Daubertcase itself to see one of many examples of this 
sort of enthusiasm for peer review. Discussing the scenario where the 
proposed testimony is not derived from independent research, the 
court looked for "other objective, verifiable evidence that the testi­
mony is based on 'scientifically valid principles."' As an example of 
such evidence, the Ninth Circuit suggested that "[o]ne means of show­
ing this is by proof that the research and analysis supporting the prof­
fered conclusions have been subjected to normal scientific scrutiny 
through peer review and publication."37 
The court then drops a footnote: "We refer, of course, to publication 
in a generally-recognized scientific journal that conditions publication 
on a bona fide process of peer review. . . ."38 The court continued: 
Peer review and publication do not, of course, guarantee that the conclusions 
reached are correct; much published scientific research is greeted with intense 
skepticism and is not borne out by further research. But the test under 
Daubertis not the correctness of the expert's conclusions but the soundness of 
his methodology. That the research is accepted for publication in a reputable 
scientific journal after being subjected to the usual rigors of peer review is a 
significant indication that it is taken seriously by other scientists, i.e., that it 
meets at least the minimal criteria of good science. 
3 9 
in part because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in 
methodology will be detected. 
DaubertI, 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (citations omitted). 
37. 	 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (DaubertII), 43 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir. 
1995). 
38. 	 Id. at 1318 n.6. 
39. 	 Id. Similarly, the Northern District of Georgia has dismissed an unpublished 
study as having "little probative value" because it was "not subject to peer re­
view." Smith v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 770 F. Supp. 1561, 1579 (N.D. Ga. 1991). 
See also,e.g., Marsh v. W.R. Grace & Co., 80 F. App'x 883, 887-88 (4th Cir. 2003) 
("Peer review helps to ensure that research papers are scientifically accurate, 
meet the standards of the scientific method, and are relevant to other scientists 
in the field .... [P]eer review involves scientists submitting a manuscript to a 
scientific publication in the field, journal editors soliciting critical reviews from 
other experts in the field and deciding whether the scientist has [generally] em­
ployed sound science."); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 313 
(5th Cir. 1989) ("While we do not hold that this failure [to be peer reviewed], in 
and of itself, renders his conclusions inadmissible, courts must nonetheless be 
especially skeptical of medical and other scientific evidence that has not been 
subjected to thorough peer review."). 
Certainly many courts understand the complexity of peer review and recog­
nize that publication peer review is far from a guarantee-or even necessarily a 
particularly strong indication-of reliability of either methodology or result, pos­
sibly to an extreme. See, e.g., Valentine v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co., Inc., 921 F. 
Supp. 666 (D. Nev. 1996) (minimizing the value of editorial peer review); State v. 
O'Key, 321 Ore. 285, 304 (Or. 1995) (noting limitations of peer review). As to 
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It is therefore clear that whether or not the Court or the Advisory 
Committee intended it, peer review has become a central part of ex­
pert evaluation. Because of that centrality, litigants have done what 
we might have expected, and some of those actions make lawyers and 
scientists uncomfortable. Before addressing those consequences and 
the discomfort, a discussion of peer review as an indicator of scientific 
reliability is appropriate. 
II. THE REALITIES OF PEER REVIEW 
Judging from many judicial discussions of peer review, one could 
be forgiven for thinking that peer review dated to the earliest develop­
ment of science, and that perhaps peer reviewers were excommuni­
cated along with Galileo for approving the publication of his thoughts 
about the shape of the planet. But in fact, peer review in its current 
form is a relatively new concept and it is far from infallible. 
Though peer review probably started in the mid-1700s, 40 as re­
cently as the 1950s peer review was part of publishing in only some 
journals in some disciplines. 4 1 Thus, for example, Crick and Watson's 
seminal article in Nature on the structure of DNA was not peer re­
viewed, not because (as various stories tell it) they did not want to tip 
off other researchers (in particular Linus Pauling) or because there 
was nobody competent to review it, but instead because Nature-then 
as now one of a handful of the undisputed leading journals in the 
world-simply had no peer-review process. As described in an annota­
tion to a reprint of the paper, 
Nature (founded in 1869)-and hundreds of other scientific journals-help 
push science forward by providing a venue for researchers to publish and de­
bate findings. Today, journals also validate the quality of this research 
through a rigorous evaluation called peer review. Generally at least two scien­
tists, selected by the journal's editors, judge the quality and originality of each 
paper, recommending whether or not it should be published. 
Science publishing was a different game when Watson and Crick submit­
ted this paper to Nature.With no formal review process at most journals, edi­
those courts, my later focus on the education of judges is presumably less rele­
vant. But those courts, too, will be already more interested in the specific type of 
peer review with which they are faced, and thus less automatically skeptical of 
efforts to obtain discovery into the peer-review process. 
While it is beyond the scope of this Article, significant parallels exist between 
the phenomenon in the context of litigation and similar incentives and responses 
in regulatory contexts, in particular in connection with the Endangered Species 
Act's requirement that conclusions be based on the "best scientific.., information 
available." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2006). This requirement has led to a strong 
preference for peer-reviewed work and thus, predictably, scholarship designed to 
satisfy that very requirement. 
40. 	 See David A. Kronick, Peer Review in 18th-Century Scientific Journalism,263 
JAMA 1321 (1990). 
41. 	 See Chan, supranote 8, at 116. 
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tors usually reached their own decisions on submissions, seeking advice 
informally only when they were unfamiliar with a subject.
4 2 
Today, the peer-review process varies widely. The most common 
form is as described above: two (or more) reviewers in a relevant field 
reviewing the article and advising the editors as to its value.43 Of 
course, the reviewers do not themselves perform the experiments or 
primary research to confirm its results, nor do they ordinarily access 
the underlying data-the data presented are rarely the raw data; they 
have long since been analyzed.44 They instead accept the data as 
presented by the authors and that the methods used matched the 
methods described, then decide whether the conclusions reached are 
appropriate and interesting in the relevant discipline, and whether 
the methods described were appropriate. 
4 5 
Sometimes the process varies. In a case explored in litigation (and 
described in more detail below), the reviewers were not anonymous 
(indeed, some were from one author's institution), and the review pro­
cess took place in a room with the authors present and an active part 
of the discussion. 46 Such an approach is likely more common when 
the publisher has all but decided to publish the work and is using the 
peer-review process as more of an editing process than a selection 
process. 
In a handful of cases, journals have begun to use "open peer re­
view," where both the identity of the reviewers and the substance of 
their comments are open; not just to the authors, but to everyone. 
47 
This has the potential of mitigating biases, incentivizing thorough re­
view, and reducing the possibility of discovery into the peer-review 
process discussed below. 
42. Exploratorium-Unwinding DNA, Annotated Version of Watson & Crick's A 
Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid, http://www.exploratorium.edu/origins/ 
coldspring/ideas/printit.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2007). 
43. See Chan, supranote 8. 
44. See id. at 120. 
45. For a more detailed discussion of questions asked in the peer-review process by 
some journals, see JAMA Reviewer Instructions, infranote 52 and accompanying 
text. 
46. See infra note 76 and accompanying text. This review process, as noted in the 
text, involved a book rather than an article, where the review process might prop­
erly differ; nonetheless, an opposing expert stated that it was unusual even in 
that context. 
47. See, e.g., Biology Direct, http://www.biology-direct.com/info/about/ ("Biology Di­
rect's key aim is to provide authors and readers ofresearch articles with an alter­
native to the traditional model of peer review. This includes making the author 
responsible for obtaining reviewers' reports via the journal's Editorial Board; 
making the peer-review process open rather than anonymous; and making the 
reviewers' reports public, thus increasing the responsibility of the referees and 
eliminating sources of abuse in the refereeing process."). Open peer review would 
be an option available to journals that seek to avoid discovery into the peer-re­
view process. See infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:643 
Occasionally-possibly even frequently-authors suggest potential 
reviewers. Especially in particularly specialized subject matters, this 
may be a necessity in order to find qualified reviewers. Even if the 
authors do not suggest reviewers, the fields may be so small that the 
author can guess reviewers' identities with some accuracy. 
No matter the structure of the process, the realities of the review 
itself can vary widely as well. Peer reviewers are typically active re­
searchers themselves with limited time. One article might receive an 
hour of review, while another might receive days.4S 
The reviewers themselves may have agendas in the field (simply by 
being active), and may well have a financial interest affected by the 
work.49 With a growing proportion of research being privately funded, 
the odds of finding an entirely disinterested researcher-especially in 
narrow subject matters-may be slim. Even if the reviewer's interest 
is simply a disinclination to endorse an article that questions a view 
the reviewer has previously held, rather than a financial stake, it still 
presents potential bias.50 And, of course, the reviewer may perceive 
the author as a competitor for funding even if the author's view is con­
sistent with the reviewer's, so bias may exist whether or not the au­
5 1thor and the reviewer agree. 
Precisely what a reviewer is asked to do varies by journal. The 
Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), for example, 
categorizes comments into seven areas of interest: "(1) Decision; (2) 
Priority; (3) Specific questions about the manuscript's quality; (4) 
Manuscript background information; (5) Remarks to the editor; (6) Re­
marks to the author; and (7) Conflict of interest statement for [the 
48. 	 Two studies indicate that the average is probably around two to three hours. See 
Alfred Yankauer, Who Are the PeerReviewers and How Much Do They Review?, 
263 JAMA 1338, 1339 (1990); Stephen Lock & Jane Smith, What do PeerReview­
ers Do?, 263 JAMA 1341, 1342 (1990). 
49. 	 The interest could be based on a desire for ongoing grants or future employment 
as a clinical trial investigator, for example. 
The potential for conflict of interest can exist whether or not an individ­
ual believes that the relationship affects his or her scientific judgment. 
Financial relationships (such as employment, consultancies, stock own­
ership, honoraria, paid expert testimony) are the most easily identifiable 
conflicts of interest and the most likely to undermine the credibility of 
the journal, the authors, and of science itself. However, conflicts can oc­
cur for other reasons, such as personal relationships, academic competi­
tion, and intellectual passion. 
INT'L COMM. OF MED. JOURNAL EDITORS, UNIFORM REQUIREMENTS FOR MANU­
SCRIPTS SUBMITTED TO BIOMEDICAL JOURNALS: WRITING AND EDITING FOR BIOMEDI­
CAL PUBLICATION 8 (2006), http://www.icmje.org/icmje.pdf [hereinafter UNIFORM 
REQUIREMENTS]. 
50. 	 Such bias may, in fact, still be financial, but indirectly so, with concerns about 
challenges to the reviewer's views reducing available funding. 
51. 	 See UNIFORM REQUIREMENTS, supra note 49. 
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reviewer]."52 JAMA further cites another paper for advice to review­
ers, which suggests, among other things, that the reviewer 
should pay close attention to the methods section and understand what the 
authors did. Does the study follow a known study design? Did the authors 
follow the principles of this design? If you have specific references on methods 
or design that you think the authors should include, it is tremendously helpful 
to provide that information. 
5 3 
Nature instructs its reviewers (called referees) with the following 
primary instructions: 
The ideal review should answer the following questions: 
" Who will be interested in the paper, and why? 
* 	 What are the main claims of the paper and how significant are they? 
* 	 Is the paper likely to be one of the five most significant papers published in 
the discipline this year? 
* How does the paper stand out from others in its field?
 
" Are the claims novel? If not, which published papers compromise novelty?
 
* 	 Are the claims convincing? If not, what further evidence is needed? 
* 	 Are there other experiments or work that would strengthen the paper 
further? 
* 	 How much would further work improve it, and how difficult would this be? 
Would it take a long time? 
* 	 Are the claims appropriately discussed in the context of previous 
literature? 
* 	 If the manuscript is unacceptable, is the study sufficiently promising to 
encourage the authors to resubmit? 
" 	 If the manuscript is unacceptable but promising, what specific work is 
needed to make it acceptable? 
5 4 
The instructions continue: 
[I]ftime is available, it is extremely helpful to the editors if referees can ad­
vise on the following points: 
* 	 Is the manuscript clearly written? 
* 	 If not, how could it be made more clear or accessible to nonspecialists? 
* 	 Would readers outside the discipline benefit from a schematic of the main 
result to accompany publication? 
* 	 Could the manuscript be shortened? 
* 	 Should the authors be asked to provide supplementary methods or data to 
accompany the paper online? 
* 	 Have the authors done themselves justice without overselling their 
claims? 
* 	 Have they been fair in treating previous literature? 
* 	 Have they provided sufficient methodological detail that the experiments 
could be reproduced? 
* 	 Is the statistical analysis of the data sound, and does it conform to the 
journal's guidelines? 
52. 	 JAMA Reviewer Instructions, http://manuscripts.jama.com/cgi-bin/main.plex? 
formtype=display-rev-instructions (last visited Jan. 5, 2007). 
53. 	 Peter Cummings & Frederick P. Rivara, Reviewing Manuscripts for Archives of 
Pediatrics & Adolescent Medicine, 156 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT 
MED. 11, 12 (2002). 
54. 	 Authors and Referees @ Nature Publishing Group, Peer-review Policy, http:/ 
www.nature.com/authors/editorial-policies/peer-review.html (last visited Jan. 
16, 2007). 
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" Are the reagents generally available? 
" Are there any ethical concerns arising from the use of human or other 
animal subjects?
5 5 
Note that the reviewers are expressly requested to discuss method­
ology only in the secondary, "[i]f time is available" set of questions. 
Presumably, of course, the publication's editorial board can evaluate 
methodologies to some extent, especially given the editors' back­
grounds.5 6 Further, problems with methodology could likely come 
through in response to some of the first set of questions, in particular 
in a discussion of whether the paper is convincing. But the relegation 
of methodology, at least expressly, to a second-tier question may be 
relevant to evaluating how well peer review can be used to evaluate a 
methodology for Daubert purposes, especially considering that 
Daubert is about methodology above all else. 
The range of activities-all of which can accurately be called "peer 
review"-is such that entire conferences have taken place solely about 
peer review.57 According to some commentators, 
There are thousands of scientific and medical journals in the world ... and 
many cannot fill their pages. The resulting seller's market means that a re­
searcher can publish even an inadequate article somewhere. Serious and ade­
quate publication peer review remains relatively rare. Even adequate 
publication peer review is sometimes limited in that the review may involve 
only one or two peer reviewers, and even the best reviewers can only identify 
gross errors in methodology or conclusions. 
5 8 
All of this means, of course, that peer review is not a unitary con­
cept, and it is not a universally reliable proxy for reliability; the fact 
that an article is peer reviewed is not remotely the final word on its 
accuracy and reliability.59 One need go no further than recent head­
lines for evidence of this, as in the case of the Korean stem-cell re­
searcher who published his work in none other than Science-work 
that turned out to be fraudulent.60 When the stakes are high-as is 
55. 	 Id. 
56. 	 See Nature: International Weekly Journal of Science, About the Editors, http:/! 
www.nature.com/nature/aboutteditors/index.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2007). 
57. 	 See, e.g., Fourth International Congress on Peer Review in Biomedical Publica­
tion, http://www.ama-assn.org/public/peer/prc-program200l.htm (last visited 
Jan. 5, 2007). Extensive scholarship exists on the range of peer review, and I 
have merely attempted to summarize it. For a lengthier and more detailed sum­
mary, see William L. Anderson et al., Daubert's Backwash: Litigation-Generated 
Science, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 619, 624 (2001). 
58. 	 See Anderson et al., supra note 57, at 624. 
59. 	 See Chan, supranote 8, at 127-29 (summarizing misconceptions about the relia­
bility of conclusions published in peer-reviewed journals). 
60. 	 See Gina Kolata, Amid Confusion, Journal Retracts Korean's Stem Cell Paper, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2005, at A8; Nicholas Wade, Clone Scientist Relied on Peers 
and Korean Pride, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2005, at Al. For a compilation of the 
original reports and the magazine's reaction, see Science, Special Online Collec­
tion: Hwang et al. and Stem Cell Issues, http://www.sciencemag.org/sciext/ 
hwang2005/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2007). 
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true in cutting-edge research with millions of research dollars at 
stake, in drug development efforts where a negative study might stop 
development of a potential blockbuster medicine, or when millions of 
dollars in damages may be in play-the incentives are commensu­
rately high for researchers to push the limits of accuracy in providing 
data. In such situations, peer reviewers may be unable or unwilling to 
test the assertions in a publication, and in fact are, by necessity, una­
ble to evaluate underlying data. 
III. THE RATIONALITY OF LITIGANTS AND EXPERTS 
So far, we have seen two important facts about peer review: First, 
courts like it as a hook to rely upon in making decisions about the 
reliability (and thus admissibility) of expert testimony, and second, its 
reality varies tremendously. These two facts create opportunities for 
litigants discussed in this Part-opportunities that have been taken 
by unsurprisingly rational and zealous advocates. 
First, it makes the litigants want, in some circumstances, to under­
cut the probative value of the fact of peer review. In the context of 
litigation, that means taking discovery and calling witnesses at trial. 
Litigants have subpoenaed and will continue to subpoena documents, 
not just from the litigation experts, but also from publications relied 
upon and the reviewers involved in the peer-review process. They also 
have deposed, and will continue to depose, those involved with the 
process, including editors and reviewers. 
Second, it makes litigants seeking to admit expert testimony-es­
pecially expert testimony likely to be challenged as unreliable or 
novel-want to improve their chances by converting litigation re­
search into peer-reviewed published research. I refer to these efforts 
as "litigation-driven scholarship." As noted above, when an expert can 
cite not just a peer-reviewed article using the methodology in question 
but also to a peer-reviewed article reaching the very conclusions to 
which he proposes to testify, courts are likely to place some weight on 
that fact. 
Both of these actions have engendered discomfort in both the scien­
tific community and the courts along the lines of that described, in a 
different context, in a products liability suit against keyboard manu­
facturers in New Jersey based on the plaintiffs carpal tunnel 
syndrome: 
Science coexists uneasily with litigation's adversary system, as the impera­
tives of partisan advocacy coupled with powerful economic incentives often 
seem to overwhelm good science. Lawyers, judges, and forensic experts some­
times engage in what literature teachers call willing suspension of disbelief. 
Scientific propositions that would cause even laymen to gasp in disbelief are 
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routinely argued in courts of law. 
6 1 
Such are the dangers of a legal system al­
lowing partisan expert testimony.
Before addressing that discomfort, let us explore exactly what is 
happening. 
A. 	 Peering Behind the Peer-Review Curtain: Taking 
Discovery 
What do I mean when I write of discovery into the peer-review pro­
cess? It can take a number of forms, and in this section, I provide 
representative examples, starting with one that has received a fair 
amount of attention. 
In the mid-1990s, a plaintiffs attorney in Louisiana contacted two 
well-credentialed historians, Gerald Markowitz of the City University 
of New York and David Rosner of Columbia University's Mailman 
School of Public Health, regarding the vinyl chloride monomer indus­
try.62 Vinyl chloride is a product used in the production of, among 
other things, pipes and hoses.63 At one point, plaintiffs' attorneys 
thought it might grow into a massive mass tort. To date, however, 
litigation has focused not on the end users but on individuals in the 
6 4 
manufacturing process who develop a particular liver cancer.
An employee with that ailment retained the attorney who hired 
the historians. 65 In discovery, the defendants (representing a sub­
stantial portion of the industry) had produced hundreds of thousands 
of pages of documents, and the historians were initially asked to act as 
consulting experts in order to create a chronology of industry knowl­
edge.6 6 Their work was primarily focused on the activities of an in­
dustry group and not on any particular company. The historians 
concluded that the companies conspired to hide the dangers of the 
products .67 
The historians' research led to two relevant work products. The 
first was a largely well-regarded book, Deceit and Denial:The Deadly 
61. 	 Reiff v. Convergent Techs., 957 F. Supp. 573, 584 (D.N.J. 1997). Judge Irenas 
went on: "Almost a century ago, when the use of hired-gun scientific witnesses 
was less common and on shakier evidentiary grounds, Judge-to-be Learned Hand 
deplored the growing trend towards the use of partisan scientific opinion testi­
mony, deeming it an 'evil in the present system.'" Id. at 584 n.16 (quoting 
Learned Hand, Historicaland PracticalConsiderationsRegardingExpert Testi­
mony, 15 HARv. L. REV. 40, 55 (1901)). Obviously, the propriety of partisan ex­
perts is well beyond the scope of this Article, but the discomfort with that concept 
is similar to the discomfort with the phenomena discussed herein. 
62. 	 See Alexander Lane, Tempestuous Times in the Ivory Tower, NEWARK STAR­
LEDGER, Dec. 5, 2004, at 1. 
63. 	 See id. 
64. 	 See id. 
65. 	 See id. 
66. 	 See id. 
67. 	 See id. 
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Politicsof IndustrialPollution,published by the University of Califor­
nia Press and the Milbank Fund.68 The book explored the lead and 
vinyl chloride industries. The book explores industry knowledge of 
dangers of the product and its manufacturing process, and the indus­
try's response (or lack thereof) to those dangers. One chapter focuses 
on the vinyl chloride industry. As noted above, the authors concluded 
that the industry possessed and conspired to cover up material evi­
dence regarding the dangers of its product. The material in the book 
relating to the vinyl chloride industry was based largely, if not en­
tirely, on documents reviewed as the historians' work as paid consult­
ing experts. 6 9 
The second work product was an expert report (with only Professor 
Markowitz's signature) provided to the plaintiffs' attorneys in antici­
pation of deposition and trial testimony: 
I have been asked to review the history of the vinyl chloride industry to under­
stand and analyze what they [sic] discovered about the health hazards of vinyl 
chloride, what the industry's response was to information about vinyl chlo­
ride's toxicity, and what the industry did with the information and knowledge 
that they [sic] acquired. 
Specifically, I was asked my opinion of whether the vinyl chloride industry 
forthrightly furnished information to the United States government and its 
responsible agencies, whether it forthrightly furnished information to the 
public, and whether it forthrightly furnished information to the people who 
7 0 
worked in the vinyl industry's plants. It is my opinion that it did not.
68. 	 GERALD MARKOWITZ & DAVID ROSNER, DECEIT AND DENIAL: THE DEADLY POLITICS 
OF INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION (2002). For a selection of book reviews, see Deceitand­
Denial.org Book Reviews, http://www.deceitanddenial.org/reviews/ (last visited 
Jan. 5, 2007). 
69. 	 As I note below, this work could potentially be classified as "litigation-driven 
scholarship" as well as being an example of discovery into the peer-review pro­
cess. It is not clear, however, that the historians' scholarly work was produced 
with an eye to litigation; at the time of the book's writing, it is possible that the 
authors were only retained as consulting witnesses. Additionally, there are sig­
nificant questions about whether this subject is properly the basis of expert testi­
mony at all, or if it is rather an effort to have a single well-credentialed witness 
telling the story of the opponent's bad documents. That, however, is beyond the 
scope ofthis Article and will be the subject ofa future article. See generallyPatri­
cia Cohen, History for Hire in Industry Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2003, at 
B7 (noting disagreement among historians as to whether testifying in public 
health endangerment cases is appropriate). Also of note, Markowitz and Rosner 
have served as expert witnesses in lead-paint litigation as well. See Gerald Mar­
kowitz & David Rosner, DeceitandDenial.org Purpose, http://www.deceitandde­
nial.org/purpose/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2007) (noting the authors' involvement in 
the Rhode Island nuisance lawsuit); see also Eric Tucker, Public Health Expert 
Testifies in Lead Paint Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 12, 2005, at Al (describing 
Markowitz's testimony in a Massachusetts lead-paint case). I am unaware of any 
comparable discovery being taken in the lead-paint litigation. 
70. 	 Gerald Markowitz, Expert Report on the Vinyl Chloride Industry (May 19, 2004) 
(on file with author). 
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The report attached a 251-page chronology that provided substan­
tially more detail on the actions than the expert report itself did.71 
The chronology and report tracked Deceit and Denial fairly closely, 
and, based on the discovery sought, the defendants appear to have an­
ticipated that the fact of Deceit and Denial's publication and peer re­
view would be important in the court's evaluation of Professor 
Markowitz's proffered testimony.
72 
Attorneys for the defendants sought to take discovery into the pro­
cess by which Deceit and Denialwas published-particularly into the 
peer-review process. They served document subpoenas, seeking corre­
spondence and the like, on the Milbank Memorial Fund and the Uni­
versity of California.7 3 They also subpoenaed several participants in 
the process, including five of the eight actual reviewers, asking, 
among other things, how they were selected as reviewers and what the 
review included.7 4 The specific results of that discovery, whatever 
they might have been, are publicly unknown; the case settled in Feb­
ruary 2006 and the motions in limine regarding Markowitz did not 
address the methodology or otherwise disclose what was learned. 7 5 
We do know that one of the defendants' experts, history professor 
Philip Scranton of Rutgers, opined that (among other things) Marko­
witz and Rosner acted unethically in participating in an "open" peer-
review process (described earlier): 
Markowitz ...admitted that he knew the Milbank Foundation reviewers for 
[the book] and had coauthored publications with some of them. Indeed, not 
only did Markowitz join in selecting the manuscript's referees; he chose sev­
eral faculty members from his own institution to evaluate the draft. 
Such practices subverted confidential, objective refereeing of scholarly manu­
scripts (single- or double-blind), for this review was largely done "among
7 6
 
friends."
 
The discovery into peer review (and Scranton's report) received na­
tional attention, including articles in The ChronicleofHigher Educa­
71. 	 Gerald Markowitz and David Rosner, Deceit and Denial Chronology (2002), 
http://www.deceitanddenial.org/docs/timeline.pdf. 
72. 	 While articles and books may have different processes for peer review, in this 
instance the publisher did subject the book to a peer-review process, and I as­
sume, I think reasonably, that if the reviewers had recommended rejection of the 
book, or recommended changes that the authors refused, publication would not 
have gone forward. Regardless of the differences, the issues in taking discovery 
into the processes are similar if not identical. 
73. 	 Lane, supra note 62. 
74. 	 Id. 
75. 	 Gulf Oil Corp.'s Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiffs' Historian, Gerald Marko­
witz, and For Other Relief, Spann v. Airco, Inc., No. 3:02cv1645WS (S.D. Miss. 
Feb. 10, 2006). 
76. 	 Philip Scranton, Expert Report on Gerald Markowitz's Work (Aug. 3, 2004), http:/ 
/www.deceitanddenial.org/docs/Scranton.pdf. I should note that I do not necessa­
rily agree with Professor Scranton's views of Professor Markowitz's work. 
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tion77 and The Nation.78 Both included suggestions by the experts 
and others that the discovery was part of an effort to intimidate or 
silence industry critics-to scare future experts off of testifying con­
trary to the industry's wishes. In the Chronicle of Higher Education 
story, the head of the university press, Lynne Withey, is quoted as 
describing the discovery as "disturbing" and "pretty sleazy on [the de­
fendants'] part."7 9 The historians created a substantial website 
presenting similar views, calling the actions "highly unusual, if un­
precedented, intrusions into the academic peer-review process."80 
Efforts to obtain discovery from the peer-review process are not, in 
fact, unprecedented. In one case, a court rejected a "scholar's privi­
lege" when faced with discovery into the peer-review process.8 1 Simi­
larly, in the breast implant litigation, the editor-in-chief of the New 
England Journalof Medicine was served with a subpoena seeking in­
formation about the publication of a relevant article.8 2 
The converse can take place as well, with the fact that an expert's 
theory failed the peer-review process becoming part of Daubert or 
other arguments. For example, in a case involving a purported epide­
miological study8 3 of illnesses near a Kerr McGee plant, the defend­
ants obtained the comments of peer reviewers who recommended 
rejection ofthe study. Those comments were used to bolster the defen­
dant's criticisms of the study: 
The Plaintiffs' Report was rejected by the journal to which it was submitted. 
That journal, Occupationaland EnvironmentalMedicine, has provided [Kerr 
McGee] with the notes of the reviewers assigned to evaluate the Report. 
One 	reviewer lodged the same criticisms that [Kerr McGee] sets out in its 
motion and brief. Her first note raises the problem of selection bias, and ques­
tions the 'internal validity" of the Report. She then asks whether researchers 
and interviewers were blinded to the status of the study subjects. They were 
77. 	 Lila Guterman, Peer Reviewers are Subpoenaed in Cancer Lawsuit Against 
Chemical Companies, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 19, 2004, at A20. 
78. 	 See Wiener, supra note 4. 
79. 	 Guterman, supra note 77. On the other hand, one of the peer reviewers, David 
Kotelchuck, said that apart from having received the subpoena at home at 11:45 
p.m., he did not feel harassed by it. He said the industry "wishes to defend it­
self ... . It's perfectly reasonable for them to want to speak to people who have 
some information about the evidence." Id. 
80. 	 Markowitz & Rosner, supra note 71. 
81. 	 Solarex Corp. v. Arco Solar, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 163 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) 
82. 	 MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE 
LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE 142-46 (1996). 
83. 	 According to the motion to exclude testimony based on the study, the researcher 
used as the "exposed" population a list of "plaintiffs or potential plaintiffs" pro­
vided to him by the plaintiffs' attorney, while the "control" group was recruited 
from church attendees. The participants were not blinded in any way, among 
other potentially problematic methodologies. Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defend­
ants' Motion to Exclude Use or Reference to Plaintiffs' Report at 10, Andrews v. 
Kerr-McGee Corp., 2001 WL 1704150 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 3, 2001) (No. 1:00CV158­
D-A). 
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not. She wonders whether the questionnaires were designed specifically for 
this Report. They were not. Continuing, the reviewer points out that state­
ments in the introduction and discussion "are not backed up by data in the 
study." "This," she says, "is not acceptable for publication." Finally, address­
ing the Report's conclusions, she writes: "The discussion makes conclusions 
that are not fully supported by the data.... The poor internalvalidity of this 
study does not allow the final conclusionsto be made .. ."84 
I include the full discussion to point out that careful peer reviewers 
are often asking precisely the questions that a court applying Daubert 
should be applying: 
* 	 Is this a sound methodology? 
• Are the conclusions supported by the data? 
" Is it acceptable in the field? 
And when peer review is done properly-as it appears to have been 
in the Kerr McGee case 5-it can be a powerful basis for either ap­
proval or rejection of the methodology in court as well as in publishing 
decisions, and is appropriately considered highly useful in determin­
ing the reliability of a methodology.8 6 But when it is not done well, its 
status as an indicator for reliability is highly questionable. 
Outside of the peer-review process, litigants sometimes seek dis­
covery into underlying data-for example, data files or interview 
notes. Such discovery is most potentially concerning when the re­
searcher involved has no connection to the litigation, and is less di­
rectly related to the Daubertprocess and is more related to an attempt 
to directly undercut or reevaluate the research.8 7 
If the specifics of the peer review in a particular case are poten­
tially relevant to a court's evaluation of expert testimony, then why 
might there be a problem at all with taking discovery into that pro­
cess? The details will come later, but for now, the core challenge to 
such discovery is a fear of intimidation and of chilling participation in 
the process, and of harm to academic freedom. Whether the litigants 
intend it or not, the specter of becoming involved in litigation-which 
84. 	 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs' Report at 5-6, 
Andrews v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 2001 WL 1704150 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 3, 2001) (No. 
1:00CV158-D-A) (citations omitted). 
85. 	 Of course, the plaintiffs defended the study. Id. 
86. 	 Sometimes the peer reviewers reject scholarship because the scholar has failed to 
clearly explain the results, rather than any flaw with the results themselves. As­
suming that the basis for the rejection is clear, such a rejection should have no 
impact on the Daubertanalysis. 
87. 	 See generally Sheila Jasanoff, Research Subpoenas and the Sociology of Knowl­
edge, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95 (1996) (discussing knowledge areas in which 
judges need education on scientific practices to effectively evaluate subpoenaed 
research materials); see also Rebecca Emily Rapp, In re Cusumano and the Un­
due Burden of Usingthe JournalistPrivilegeas a Model for ProtectingResearch­
ers from Discovery, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 265 (2000) (discussing a First Circuit case, In 
re Cusumano v. Microsoft, 162 F.3d 708 (1st Cir. 1998), which extended the jour­
nalist privilege to third-party researchers). 
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is undeniably at minimum a hassle and at maximum highly disrup­
tive and expensive-has the potential to make potential peer review­
ers hesitate before agreeing to take part in the process, especially if 
the litigation removes anonymity that had previously been promised 
the reviewers. Further, if it is permitted on demand, without special 
standards or controls, litigants may indeed recognize and take the op­
portunity to chill the participation of skilled researchers and thus slow 
the development of science. Any approach to this issue must at least 
consider these concerns. Markowitz and Rosner themselves summa­
rized the concerns well, describing the defendants' efforts as "attempts 
by the chemical industry to shut down discussion of their past and to 
interfere with the peer-review process, academic freedom and open de-
bate."8 8 They continue: 
Should the peer review process be subject to industry-sponsored subpoenas? 
Should we worry about being brought in for depositions if we review a "contro­
versial" book? Would we work on controversial subjects at all if industry law­
yers 	are able to get at our notes, our documents and even our colleagues? 
Would we feel free to research these topics if we knew that industry can hire 
fellow historians to devote months to pick through footnotes and develop so­
phistic (not sophisticated) arguments meant to undermine colleagues' profes­
sional credibility and integrity? Should we be concerned that reviewers may 
decide to avoid participating in the review process if they know that industry 
lawyers can later order them into court proceedings? These are certainly is­
sues 	that should be discussed.
8 9 
B. 	 You Want Peer Review? We'll Get Peer Review: 
Litigation-Driven Scholarship 
As courts' consideration of expert testimony becomes more focused 
on judging reliability based on the presence or absence of peer review 
of the principles, methodology, and conclusions, litigants (and their 
experts) have seen an opportunity to improve their chances by ob­
taining peer review themselves-often by submitting something very 
similar to the litigation expert report to a peer-reviewed journal in 
hopes of getting it published. Again, some examples may help. 
Perhaps the most striking example came in litigation against Du-
Pont relating to alleged birth defects resulting from fungicide expo­
sure.90 In that case, the plaintiffs' attorneys paid for a series of 
88. 	 Gerald Markowitz & David Rosner, The Chemical Industry's Attack on Histori­
ans, HIST. NEWS NETWORK (Dec. 6, 2004), http://hnn.us/articles/8730.html. 
89. 	 Id. In the context of discovery into uninvolved researchers, Jasanoff states that 
the efforts "may be motivated by both legitimate and illegitimate considerations." 
Jasanoff, supranote 87, at 97. "Litigants may try to use the research subpoena to 
intimidate and overburden researchers or to introduce irrelevant and confusing 
issues into the fact-finding process." Id. But they may also "expect to find genu­
ine discrepancies between the 'facts' reported by scientists and the observations 
on which their findings were based." Id. 
90. 	 See Anderson et al., supra note 57, at 624-25. 
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studies, with one of the studies costing at least $200,000.91 The paid 
expert "discussed two of the tests with the lead researcher (his col­
league at the same university), provided samples of the fungicide, and 
assisted in the design and interpretation of the studies."9 2 One study, 
which supported the assertions of the paid experts, was published in 
the peer-reviewed journal NeuroToxicology without any conflict disclo­
sure (and none, evidently, was required).9 3 The other studies were not 
submitted for publication. 
94 
An example not involving new studies relates to the anti-choles­
terol drug Baycol (cerivastatin), which was voluntarily withdrawn 
from the market on August 8, 2001, by its manufacturer, Bayer Corpo­
ration. 95 Over 10,000 lawsuits, most of them alleging various muscle 
injuries, were eventually filed, with the federal multidistrict litigation 
eventually reaching the third largest federal multidistrict litigation to 
date. As has become common in mass tort litigation, attorneys for 
both sides retained experts in many areas, including the obvious sub­
jects of general and specific causation, but also subjects such as medi­
cal and corporate ethics, with experts opining on the appropriateness 
of the company's actions based on knowledge at various times. 
The first two trials, both in early 2003, ended in defense verdicts 
(as did all trials to date). Later, three paid experts retained by plain­
tiffs' attorneys in the litigation published an article in the Journalof 
the American Medical Association discussing Bayer's actions in con­
nection with the medication. The article largely tracked the opinions 
given as paid expert witnesses by the authors and disclosed their role 
as plaintiffs' experts while stating that the article was based only on 
public information. 9 6 To date, those authors have not appeared in any 
Baycol trials, though they have been designated as experts since then. 
91. 	 Id. at 624 n.24. 
92. 	 Id. at 624. 
93. 	 See id. at 624-25; see also W.G. McLean et al., The Effect of Benomyl on Neurite 
Outgrowth in Mouse NB2A and Human SH-SY5Y NeuroblastomaCells In Vitro, 
19 NEURoToxIcOLOGY 629 (1998) (containing no reference to the authors' involve­
ment with related litigation). 
94. 	 See Anderson et al., supranote 57, at 624. As of the date of the Anderson article, 
the plaintiffs' expert had been excluded in at least two matters. See id. at 624 
n.21. 
95. 	 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Talk Paper, Bayer Voluntarily With­
draws Baycol (Aug. 8, 2001), http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/2001V 
ANS01095.html. In private practice, I worked as one of Bayer's attorneys in the 
Baycol litigation and continue to do a minimal amount of consulting work in the 
litigation. 
96. 	 Bruce M. Psaty et al., Potentialfor Conflict of Interest in the Evaluation of Sus­
pected Adverse DrugReactions: Use of Cerivastatinand Risk of Rhabdomyolysis, 
292 JAMA 2622, 2630 (2004) [hereinafter Psaty et al., Potentialfor Conflict]. In 
the same issue, Bayer's response (authored by Joseph D. Piorkowski, Jr., D.O., 
J.D., M.P.H., who served as Bayer's counsel) to Psaty et al. was published, as was 
an alternative view authored by Brian L. Strom, M.D., M.P.H., of the University 
2007] WHEN LITIGATION AND SCIENCE COLLIDE 667
 
The Kerr McGee case cited above is perhaps the most typical case 
of litigation-driven scholarship.9 7 The report in question there was 
clearly created in connection with litigation-indeed, the "exposed" 
population was identified by the plaintiffs' firm itself, obviously creat­
ing enormous potential for selection bias. If not for the fact of the re­
tention of the experts, those studies would almost certainly not have 
occurred. 
Litigation-driven scholarship is not, to be sure, limited to plaintiffs' 
experts. A 1992 Ohio asbestos case discussed the admissibility of an 
article written by one of the defendant's experts: 
The article was written by defendant's expert, Dr. Corn, with fifteen other 
scientists. Dr. Corn compiled and analyzed air sampling tests conducted in 
seventy-one school buildings across the country which contained asbestos 
materials. The expert concluded that the levels of asbestos fibers in the air 
inside the schools were not higher than the levels in air outside the schools, 
and, therefore no incremental health risk from asbestos existed in these build­
ings. The article was submitted for peer review before publication in the sci­
entific journal [Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology].9 8 
The expert acknowledged that the data he used came from other court 
cases in which he was involved as an expert, but stated that he pre­
pared the article as a researcher, not as an expert witness. 99 The 
court admitted the testimony.1 0 0 
This incentive to create scholarship may result in the publication 
of whole new areas of purported expertise that have not previously 
been published and that may not genuinely be properly the subject of 
expert testimony-scientists opining about the ethics of defendants, 
for example. 10 1 The potential for bias is, of course, obvious: 
of Pennsylvania (who had served as an expert witness for Bayer). Joseph D. Pior­
kowski, Jr., Bayer's Response to "Potentialfor Conflict of Interest in the Evalua­
tion of Suspected Adverse Drug Reactions: Use of Cerivastatin and Risk of 
Rhabdomyolysis," 292 JAMA 2655, 2657 (2004); Brian L. Strom, Potential for 
Conflictof Interest in the EvaluationofSuspectedAdverse DrugReactions, 292 J. 
AM. MED. ASS'N 2643, 2645 (2004). The issue also included a Journalofthe Amer­
ican Medical Association editorial on the subject and a reply from Psaty et al. 
Bruce M. Psaty et al., Authors'Reply to Bayer's Response to "Potentialfor Conflict 
of Interest in the Evaluation ofSuspected Adverse DrugReactions: Use of Cerivas­
tatin and Risk ofRhabdomyolysis," 292 JAMA 2658 (2004) [hereinafter Psaty et 
al., Authors'Reply]. All authors' involvement as counsel or experts was disclosed, 
though no authors disclosed the amounts they had been paid in the litigation. 
See Piorkowski, Jr., supra;Psaty et al., Authors' Reply, supra, at 2659; Psaty et 
al., Potentialfor Conflict, supra; Strom, supra. 
97. 	 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
98. 	 Worthington City Schs. v. Abco Insulation, 616 N.E.2d 550, 553 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1992). 
99. 	 See id. 
100. See id. 
101. The propriety of this sort of expert is beyond the scope of this Article. Briefly, 
though, my basic concern with such testimony is not Daubert-relatedas such, but 
instead has to do with whether the testimony aids the jury. Thus, for example, I 
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[Tihe reliability and accuracy of litigation-based research is likely to be 
viewed with suspicion because of the potential bias arising from the source of 
funding for the research and the relationship between the researchers and the 
lawyers. Pressures resulting from the need to have the "right" outcome may 
result in manipulated procedures, distorted data, selective reporting of re­
sults, or even falsified outcomes.102 
It is no surprise, given the incentives created by Daubert and the 
Federal Rules' implementation of Daubert, that litigation-driven 
scholarship has developed.103 Nor is it surprising, as noted earlier, 
that discovery into peer review is perhaps on the upswing. In the next 
Part, I consider whether either of these developments is necessarily 
problematic. 
IV. HOW SCIENCE AND LAW CAN STRENGTHEN
 
EACH OTHER
 
Expert witnesses are allowed to testify if they are able to, among 
other things, "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue."10 4 The goal of their testimony, therefore, 
must be to explain why a disputed allegation is either more or less 
likely to be true. In order to evaluate any testimony, a court or jury 
considers the basis of the testimony-the data on which it is based, to 
put it another way-and the reasonableness of the witness's 
conclusions. 
This process-questioning the premises, the methods, the reasona­
bleness-tracks in large part the process used in evaluating scientific 
research.105 The post-publication evaluation of research, whether by 
certainly can see the value of an attorney hiring a historian to prepare a chronol­
ogy of documents and events that supports a particular interpretation of the facts 
of a case. But once that chronology is completed, I believe a jury can ordinarily 
reach the conclusions on its own, and that presenting a purported expert to tell 
the story is potentially improperly placing what should be an attorney's closing 
argument in the middle of the trial. As noted earlier, see supra note 69, I will 
address these issues in a future article. 
102. 	 Anderson et al., supra note 57, at 621. 
103. 	 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit (prior to the Supreme Court's Daubertdecision) noted 
that a lack of peer review is often a problem with litigation-driven scholarship. 
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 n.3 (9th Cir. 1991) 
("Scientific studies conducted in anticipation of litigation must be scrutinized 
much more carefully than studies conducted in the normal course of scientific 
inquiry. This added dose of skepticism is warranted, in part, because studies 
generated especially for use in litigation are less likely to have been exposed to 
the normal peer review process, which is one of the hallmarks of reliable scien­
tific investigation."). 
104. 	 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
105. 	 See supraPart II. I do not suggest that the litigation process and its adversarial 
nature are the same as peer review, only that there is substantial overlap. Cf. 
SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN 
AMERICA 8 (Harvard Univ. Press 1995) ("[The cultures of law and science are in 
fact mutually constitutive in ways that have previously escaped systematic anal­
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replicating it or building on it, is a critical part of the progress of sci­
ence.10 6 Indeed, this post-publication evaluation is probably more im­
portant than the publication peer review that courts (and this Article) 
focus on. 
Such a searching examination of research is highly effective at 
eventually ferreting out bad research, and that conclusion is the pre­
mise of two key conclusions: First, science and law have numerous 
checks already in place to catch bad research, and so courts need not 
automatically reject litigation-driven scholarship. Second, those same 
checks are strengthened and complemented, especially in the context 
of litigation-driven scholarship, by permitting discovery into the peer-
review process. I address each in turn. 
A. 	 Why Courts Should Not Exclude All Litigation-Driven 
Scholarship 
Under Daubert and Rule 702, the trial judge makes a threshold 
determination of reliability leaving the ultimate conclusion of credibil­
ity and probative value to the jury. For the same reason that judges 
instruct juries that they are entitled to consider the financial interest 
of a witness in determining the witness's credibility, the fact that a 
particular item of research was performed and published by a paid 
litigation witness (whether paid by the plaintiff or defendant) is, of 
course, relevant to consideration of its credibility. The source of the 
funding is relevant just as the funding of clinical trials by pharmaceu­
tical companies is relevant to the evaluation of those studies because 
the funding of research demonstrably can affect its outcomes.10 7 
To put it mildly, such bias likely exists in work performed by ex­
perts in litigation; it is highly unusual for a party's retained expert to 
testify contrary to the party's litigation position. Though experts are 
generally precluded from working for a contingent fee, 0 8 attorneys 
undoubtedly consider their success in obtaining verdicts in their favor 
in deciding whether to rehire experts, so even when publishing an ar­
ticle nominally separate from their litigation work, the authors of liti­
gation-driven (or even merely litigation-related) scholarship do have a 
financial interest in the outcome of the research. The conflict of inter­
ysis.... [T]hese institutions jointly produce our social and scientific knowledge 
106. 	 See Anderson et al., supra note 57, at 628-29. 
107. 	 See generally Frank Davidoffet al., Sponsorship,Authorship, andAccountability, 
345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 825 (2001), available at http://content.nejm.org/cgi/ 
content/full/345/11/825. 
108. 	 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) cmt. 3 (2003) ("The common 
law rule in most jurisdictions is that it is improper to... pay an expert witness a 
contingent fee."). 
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est is at least as real as in the context where research is funded by, for 
example, a pharmaceutical company. 
An additional reason to be skeptical of litigation-driven scholarship 
arises from the timelines of scientists as compared the timelines of 
lawyers. Science (and academic research more generally) tends to be 
incremental, where it can take years to develop a body of research that 
addresses a hypothesis.1 0 9 The ongoing review of conclusions by col­
leagues and competitors takes time, as theories are considered, tested, 
and discarded, revised, or confirmed. Litigation necessarily moves 
faster: statutes of limitations run; witnesses forget, move, or die; 
plaintiffs want a recovery; defendants want a resolution; and attor­
neys want their fees, whether hourly or contingent. In most lawsuits, 
the expert's opinion (and thus, if relevant here, the litigation-driven 
research) is a one-time event, with at most minor changes as the case 
progresses. Even if the work receives publication peer review, it may 
not receive the ongoing review of peers (at least during the relevant 
litigation time period), and so it has not been genuinely tested.110 
Further, litigants demand firm conclusions and an expert's com­
mitment to those conclusions. For a testifying expert, "probably" is 
not a good answer very often. In contrast, the incremental nature of 
much scientific research requires hints, false starts, ideas that fail, 
and good guesses all along the process. 
That said, just as medical journals and courts do not automatically 
reject studies paid for by drug sponsors or reject the first study in a 
particular area, the fact that research is done in the context of litiga­
tion does not mean it should automatically be excluded, either from 
journals or evidence in trial. Rule 702, indeed, provides that the liti­
gation origin of research should be considered a factor, but only a fac­
tor, in evaluating expert testimony. 1 ' Many questions of interest to 
public health (or other important policies) may only be evaluated in 
the context of litigation. In cases where a product has been with­
drawn or recalled, for example, there is no well-funded group other 
than attorneys who have an interest in learning more about the prod­
uct. If paid litigation experts do not perform certain research, it may 
well not be done at all-and the financial interest in the outcome is 
not significantly different for attorneys than for sponsoring companies 
paying for studies of their products. This is likely the most obvious in 
mass tort litigation, where nobody besides attorneys has any incentive 
to fund ongoing research into withdrawn products; but that research 
may provide useful information for future products, and those attor­
neys can have hundreds of thousands of dollars available for perform­
109. See Anderson et al., supra note 57, at 630-31. 
110. See id. 
111. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note to the 2000 amendment. 
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ing the research, whether it is original research or a post-hoc 
evaluation of a combination of clinical trials.1 12 
Put briefly, we trust scholarly journals, and juries, to be able to 
evaluate the weight that should be given to the bias in financial sup­
port in other contexts. That trust should extend to judges' abilities to 
evaluate the reliability of methodology in a Daubert analysis and to 
juries' abilities to consider the relevancy of potential bias-at least 
enough to identify bias as one factor rather than a per se basis for 
exclusion. One can quite reasonably argue that we ought not be ask­
ing juries (or even judges) to be evaluating science at all; such an ar­
gument counsels in favor of systems ofhealth courts and the like. But 
if judges and juries are to be evaluating science at all, they will be 
considering scholarship with the potential of bias, and we ought to 
trust them to consider that bias as well as they consider other biases. 
Additionally, serious scholars have substantial reasons to self-reg­
ulate to avoid the scorn of colleagues or, perhaps more problematic, a 
published court decision declaring them unreliable or dishonest. Rep­
utation is, in many respects, the coin of the realm in academia, though 
in some cases that coin may well be traded for the more literal coin of 
retention as a paid expert. While it obviously is not a panacea, danger 
to reputation (a danger that may threaten future expert retentions) 
helps balance the risks of accepting litigation-driven scholarship. 
Finally, the availability of discovery into the peer-review process 
itself (discussed in the next section) helps mitigate the potential harm 
of litigation-driven scholarship. Attorneys can learn about numerous 
subjects potentially relevant to the Daubertdecision (and to the fact­
finder's evaluation of the expert's credibility): 
* 	 What was the nature of the peer review (anonymous, open, one 
reviewer, expertise of reviewer)? 
" How long did the reviewers take to review the piece? 
* 	 Did the reviewers know that the authors had a financial interest in 
the outcome? 
* 	 Did the reviewers or editors have a financial interest in the out­
come of the litigation? 
* 	 Were the reviewers acquainted or friendly with the author? 
* 	 Did the author exploit personal connections with the editors or 
reviewers? 
" Is the journal or publisher involved well regarded? 
" Do they have an interest in the outcome of the litigation? 
Thus, especially with liberal discovery available to litigants to fully 
develop the potential biases or other problems with the research, liti­
gation-driven scholarship should not be rejected strictly because it 
112. 	 See supra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing a case in which plaintiffs' 
attorneys spent $200,000 on a single study). 
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comes out of litigation. That fact does not sufficiently distinguish it 
from other scholarship that is published and admitted daily in reputa­
ble journals and in courts. 
B. 	 Why Courts Should Allow Some Discovery into Peer 
Review 
The potential value of litigation-driven scholarship is not terribly 
controversial; after all, most of the examples cited above were pub­
lished, some in prestigious journals. The practice of litigants taking 
discovery into the peer-review process, however, appears more broadly 
disturbing. In this section, I argue that the concerns with such discov­
ery, should lead us to regulate, not bar, the practice. Taking discovery 
into peer review offers an opportunity for litigants and courts to better 
evaluate the resulting scholarship and to know how much weight to 
put on the fact of peer review. Additionally, this discovery process has 
the salutary effect of educating judges about the realities of peer re­
view, discussed above, giving them a better foundation for Daubert 
and related decisions. I address the reasons in the following three 
subsections. 
1. 	 The Possibilityof Subpoenas and DepositionsHelps Counter 
Bad Litigation-DrivenScholarship 
As noted above, the availability of discovery into the peer-review 
process can provide real assistance in balancing the realities of litiga­
tion-driven scholarship. The adversarial system is not unique to law; 
it is in fact a critical part of science, and adding to it can strengthen it. 
As Nobel Laureate in Medicine Georg Von B~k6sy put it: 
[One] way of dealing with errors is to have friends who are willing to spend 
the time necessary to carry out a critical examination of the experimental de­
sign beforehand and the results after the experiments have been completed. 
An even better way is to have an enemy. An enemy is willing to devote a vast 
amount of time and brain power to ferreting out errors both large and small, 
and this without any compensation. The trouble is that really capable enemies 
are scarce; most of them are only ordinary. Another trouble with enemies is 
that they sometimes develop into friends and lose a good deal of their zeal. It 
was in this way the writer lost his three best enemies. Everyone, not just 
scientists, need a few good enemies!1 13 
113. 	 Von Bdkdsy's statement, originally at GEORG VON BigKsY, EXPERIMENTS IN HEAR­
ING 8-9 (E.G. Wever ed. & trans., 1960), was quoted in George A. Olah's Nobel 
Lecture in 1994. See George A. Olah, Nobel Lecture, My Search for Carbocations 
and Their Role in Chemistry (Dec. 8, 1994), available at http://nobelprize.org/ 
chemistry/laureates/1994/olah-lecture.pdf. This "enemy" concept likely has par­
ticular strength in the context of dramatic changes in a field, such as Crick and 
Watson's paper. If their assertions had been disproved, their careers would have 
been at least seriously injured, if not ended. 
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Except for the absence of compensation, someone who "is willing to 
devote a vast amount of time and brain power to ferreting out errors 
both large and small" sounds a lot like a devoted attorney preparing 
for a cross-examination. But attorneys can do even more than even 
"really capable enemies" in the sciences can do-lawyers can compel 
document production and testimony and find not just large and small 
errors, but flaws in the publication process itself. 
Consider the following questions: How often would a competing re­
searcher challenge the method used in peer review? How often would 
a competing researcher demand access to the underlying research, to 
the extent of wanting to (and being allowed to) reinterview subjects of 
a study? How often could they demand an opportunity to spend hours 
asking the peer reviewer about the review and obtain copies of the 
comments of the reviewers? How often could they bring the court's 
power of subpoena to bear? How often would they have the money 
available to do those interviews and hire a consulting expert to pains­
takingly evaluate the work? The answer, of course, is "virtually 
never" to every one of the questions. As suggested by Von B~k~sy's 
speech, science already is reliant on an adversarial system; allowing 
lawyers into it is an extension and expansion of the same. It may be 
uncomfortable, but it is not new. 
Sheila Jasanoff, writing in the context of subpoenas to researchers 
who do not have a connection to the litigation in issue, disputes the 
ability of courts "to distinguish between valid and invalid scientific 
claims," arguing that the expectation rests on "questionable assump­
tions about the practice of science."1 1 4 Those assumptions are as set 
forth below: 
" that evidence of fraud, error, and poor scientific practice can be detected 
unambiguously from written records; 
" that challenged methodologies (including methods of analysis and inter­
pretation) clearly conform or do not conform to "scientific" standards; 
* 	 that such standards preexist and hence can be mechanically applied dur­
ing legal inquiry; and 
" that the adversarial process is conducive to sorting out disputes concern­
ing the validity and reliability of competing research practices. 
1 1 5 
Jasanoff argues that those assumptions are inconsistent with, if not 
contradicted by, modern thought about the sociology of science.
1 1 6 
While this argument does counsel in favor of caution when al­
lowing wide-ranging discovery into nonparty research, in fact it sup­
ports the availability of certain peer-review discovery because it will 
permit litigants to explore the very ambiguities in science that Jasa­
noff identifies, and because it will assist in educating the courts about 
the limitations of science. Those courts may well still make declara­
114. Jasanoff, supra note 87, at 97. 
115. Id. 
116. See id. 
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tions that suggest a belief in scientific certainty, but the more they 
learn about the scientific process, the more that claimed certainty will 
be a useful fiction rather than oversimplifying. Put another way, a 
necessary assumption of practicing law is that a fact can be estab­
lished, while a foundation of science is that all purported facts can be 
challenged. Courts that expect final answers from science are being 
unrealistic, and opening the black box of peer review will help reveal 
the reality while permitting courts to do a better job of reaching final 
legal answers. Thus, rather than using a lack of understanding of sci­
ence to rationalize keeping litigants and courts out of it, we should 
recognize peer-review discovery as a way to improve that 
understanding. 
2. 	 The Possibility of Subpoenas and DepositionsProvides
 
Incentives to Do the Research and the PeerReview
 
Correctly
 
Researchers quite reasonably lament the possibility of being de­
posed.'1 7 Depositions are unpleasant experiences, presumably even 
more so when being done with the aim of undercutting the validity of 
one's scholarly work. But having to face that possibility may create 
additional incentives to strive for better research and better peer re­
view. Peer reviewers, properly, do not generally examine the underly­
ing documents, data, etc. on which scholarly research is based, and so 
researchers may feel somewhat safe in using fudged data. When the 
stakes are sufficiently high, cross-examining attorneys will often do 
exactly what peer reviewers do not (as well as what they do). 
Having such detailed scrutiny as even a remote possibility may de­
crease the likelihood of scholars using any sleight of hand. And that 
possibility becomes ever more remote when the research is genuinely 
above reproach. Similarly, if the peer-review process is demonstrably 
solid-demonstrable through correspondence and notes, which can be 
produced with relatively little difficulty-the likelihood of a deposition 
shrinks, as there is little potential value.11S 
117. 	 See Wiener, supranote 4, at 21 ("Academics aren't used to being 'commanded' to 
do anything, and are unlikely to have attorneys of their own to accompany them 
to depositions."). In describing the depositions involved in Deceit and Denial, 
Wiener writes: 
Cook's deposition took only an hour, but it was "an hour ofbattering and 
legal tricks, and the goal was to trip you up and get you confused," she 
said. "They kept asking me how long I had known Gerry Markowitz. I 
said, 'Are you asking if I had an affair?' They said, 'No, why are you 
asking that?' I said, 'Where I come from, that's the implication of your 
question.' They said, 'Where do you come from?'" 
Id. I admit to being uncertain how asking how long a witness had known a prof­
fered expert constitutes either battering or a legal trick. 
118. 	 This point may be moderately naive. I am aware that many depositions are 
taken without any real hope of getting something useful. The percentage that fit 
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This point remains applicable whether or not the research in ques­
tion is litigation-driven, or in fact whether or not the expert witness 
was involved in the research in question. If the expert is relying on 
peer-reviewed research that he did not perform, the opponents of the 
expert's testimony may well have a legitimate reason to explore the 
validity of that research, though, as I note below, the burden to show 
the propriety of the discovery may appropriately be greater. 
3. 	 Discovery into the Peer-Review Process Opens the Black Box 
of Peer Review and Educates the Courts 
Some commentators have looked at the decade-plus of experience 
with Daubertand concluded that the shift in focus has had relatively 
minor effects on the outcome of cases, but, importantly, that it has 
educated judges about the realities of science.'1 9 By providing judges 
factors to consider, the argument goes, judges will learn more about 
how those factors relate to reliability and how scientists think about 
the issues. Similarly, allowing discovery into peer-review processes 
will inform judges about the realities of those processes, and the many 
forms that those processes take, as described above. 
In lay press coverage of the Deceit and Denial depositions, the re­
viewers and others focused on the perceived oddity of the attorneys 
asking the reviewers if they had checked all of the footnotes. 120 This 
focus misses the point. The point of the questions was almost cer­
tainly not to show that the reviewers failed in their job, but rather to 
point out the limitations of that job and thus of the endorsement, as 
suggested earlier. If the defendants could later show that those foot­
notes were not, in fact, accurate, then the reviewers' recommendation 
of publication could reasonably be called into question, not necessarily 
because they did not do their job, but because facts on which they (rea­
sonably) relied were inaccurate.' 2 ' Such a showing would lead the 
courts involved to learn more about what peer reviewers actually do. 
We have already seen that some judges have an oversimplified 
view of the realities of peer review. Through allowing discovery into 
peer review, judges will learn through seeing the outcome of that dis-
that description rises as the stakes rise. As noted below, I do have some sugges­
tions to deter fishing expeditions, including the possibility of a judge appointing 
an expert to evaluate the request to take discovery into the peer-review process. 
119. 	 Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of 
Scientific Admissibility Standards,91 VA. L. REV. 471, 474 (2005). 
120. 	 See Wiener, supra note 4, at 21 ("The prevailing practice at university presses is 
that manuscript reviewers are not expected to check footnotes; Lynne Withey, 
director ofthe University ofCalifornia Press, asked, 'How could you expect people 
to do that?"'). 
121. 	 See, e.g., Jennifer Couzin, Stem Cells:And How the Problems Eluded Peer Re­
viewers andEditors, SCIENCE, Jan. 6, 2006, at 23 (Science's editor-in-chief Donald 
Kennedy says that "[p]eer review cannot detect [fraud] if it is artfully done"). 
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covery that peer review is not binary, but instead a spectrum, and will 
be better able to evaluate scholarship that is presented to them as 
peer reviewed, and better able to determine its reliability and 
admissibility. 
V. PROPOSALS FOR MITIGATING POTENTIAL HARM 
The reasons I have suggested for developing a level of comfort with 
discovery into the peer-review process and with litigation-driven 
scholarship are all related, and they relate to the goals of Daubert, a 
recognition that law and science, while having substantial differences, 
have overlapping magisteria. "The net of science covers the empirical 
universe: what is it made of (fact) and why does it work this way (the­
ory)."12 2 Similarly, law-as it relates to expert testimony-has to do 
with facts (what the expert tells the factfinder jury it should conclude) 
and theory (why the jury should do so). The relevant criteria for eval­
uating those asserted facts and theories should largely line up. 
Scientists (theoretically) welcome challenges from sources within 
their magisterium, whether by way of competing publications, chal­
lenges in the peer-review process, revisions in the publication process, 
or otherwise. They should not automatically reject similar challenges 
from an overlapping magisterium, law, simply because they come 
from outside their home turf. 
Of course, the complaints about discovery into peer review are not 
baseless. Depositions are unpleasant and expensive, complying with 
document requests is expensive, and lawyers are largely not scientists' 
favorite companions (and are, too, expensive). 123 Between the incon­
venience and expense, the availability of such discovery may be a dis­
incentive to participate in peer review, especially given the fact that 
most peer review is done as a professional obligation rather than for 
pay. 
Before addressing some ways to mitigate that disincentive, a real­
ity check may help. Even if peer-review discovery becomes much more 
widely adopted, depositions and document discovery will almost cer­
tainly take place in a very small percentage of instances of peer re­
view. Most scientific scholarship is simply not that interesting to 
litigators, just like most legal scholarship is not that interesting to 
scientists (or, sadly, others!). Thus, the universe of cases in which liti­
gation is even on the horizon is small, and that universe is likely iden­
tifiable in advance (e.g., articles about drugs, devices, toxic effects of 
industries, and a handful of other items, plus perhaps some patent-
related scholarship). If a publisher chose not to accept for publication 
122. 	 Gould, supra note 7, at 19. 
123. 	 See Wiener, supra note 4, at 21 (noting the unpleasant manner in which peer 
reviewers have been deposed). 
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what I have described as litigation-driven scholarship,124 whether to 
avoid hassle or because it concluded that the inherent biases militated 
against such scholarship, the universe would get still smaller. 
Alternatively, a journal could switch to an open peer-review pro­
cess, with the reviewers' comments and identities open to anyone, sim­
ilarly reducing discovery exposure. 12 5 Such a switch would reduce 
both the likelihood and extent (and thus burden) of peer-review 
discovery. 
Journals also should require the disclosure of litigation relation­
ships. By their terms, at least some journals' disclosure policies do not 
require such disclosure at all.12 6 In contrast, the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedurerequire expert witnesses to disclose the compensation 
to be paid for their testimony.127 In at least those cases involving liti­
gation-driven scholarship, authors should be obligated to disclose not 
just the fact of their litigation work but also, at minimum, an estimate 
of the payments received. In an era of expert witnesses on all sides 
being paid up to $500 or more an hour for work and testimony, con­
sumers of that scholarship should receive at least the same informa­
tion that a jury would receive.12s 
Further, the number of individual cases that would go beyond doc­
ument discovery to depositions is even smaller, because, if the docu­
ments indicate thorough and unbiased review, the attorneys are likely 
to conclude that a deposition is not worth it. The litigation and hassle 
exposure, in other words, would be small even if those involved in the 
124. 	 Though I think that litigation-driven scholarship is not inherently untrustwor­
thy, a journal could rationally conclude otherwise, just as some have refused to 
accept articles funded by industry. If anything, I think litigation-driven scholar­
ship is less trustworthy than industry-funded work (as the intended outcome is 
explicit in the former and less so in the latter), and so a policy rejecting litigation-
driven work but accepting industry-funded work could be consistent. 
125. 	 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
126. 	 See Jeffrey M. Drazen & Gregory D. Curfman, FinancialAssociationsofAuthors, 
346 NEW ENG. J MED. 1901, 1901 (2002), availableat http://content.nejm.org/cgi 
content/full1346/24/1901 ("Because the essence of reviews and editorials is selec­
tion and interpretation of the literature, the Journalexpects that authors of such 
articles will not have any significant financial interest in a company (or its com­
petitor) that makes a product discussed in the article."). "Significant" is defined 
in that article as $10,000 or more in a year; insignificant interests are to be dis­
closed in the article. Id. Notably, the policy makes no mention of involvement in 
litigation, though the disclosure forms do note the relevance of expert work. See, 
e.g., Letter from The New England Journal of Medicine Editorial Staff to Poten­
tial Authors, Financial Disclosure & Authorship Form, http://authors.nejm.org/ 
misd/disclosRev.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2007). The form asks only for a "brief 
description," not for dollar figures or the like. As noted above, even that is not 
always disclosed. See supra note 6. 
127. 	 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). 
128. 	 Such information may well be valuable information in work that is not litigation 
driven as well. 
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peer-review process had no protection beyond the ordinary protections 
in third-party discovery. This sort of discovery simply does not hap­
pen that often today and is unlikely to happen much more often in the 
future.129 
And yet there is legitimate concern, and therefore some ways to 
mitigate the risks may be valuable, both in the publication process 
and in the courts. As for reviewers and publishers, in those cases 
where litigation seems possible (or in all cases, to better spread costs), 
peer reviewers could demand that the publishers indemnify them for 
expenses associated with discovery, including the cost of counsel and 
the reviewers' time.13o (Often, of course, the parties to litigation end 
up paying for the time of deponents, especially if the deponent is 
outside the scope of the subpoena power.) The additional costs to the 
publisher will be minimal at most, especially if its peer-review process 
is solid and well documented (which is a good thing to encourage in all 
events). The financial impact on the availability of qualified peer re­
viewers should be minimal, with those costs able to be spread by the 
publisher. 
Yet peer-review discovery does create dangers not created by the 
average discovery process, and concerns about academic freedom and 
disincentives are not baseless. I therefore propose certain protections 
that balance those legitimate concerns against the litigants' legitimate 
interests in testing assertions. 
When a party seeks discovery into research performed by a testify­
ing expert and cited or relied upon by that expert-in other words, the 
party seeks drafts of the work, reviewers' comments in the expert's 
possession, editorial suggestions, and the like-that discovery should 
be granted as a matter of course under the ordinary discovery protec­
tions.131 Thus, if a party's discovery is not calculated to lead to the 
discovery of relevant materials, it can properly be quashed, but no spe­
cial protection is necessary. The expert has, after all, submitted him­
129. 	 A further reality check: While discovery into peer review is relatively new, re­
search subpoenas have been around for at least a decade. See Jasanoff, supra 
note 87. I am aware of no evidence, even anecdotal, that any researchers or re­
viewers have in fact been deterred from getting involved in potentially litigation-
related research. The absence of declarations about it is not proof of its actual 
absence, of course, but it is worth noting. 
130. 	 In fact, the book's co-publisher paid for the reviewers' legal fees in the depositions 
related to Deceitand Denial. See Wiener, supra note 4, at 21. 
131. 	 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any 
matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party, in­
cluding the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any 
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of per­
sons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may 
order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the ac­
tion. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery 
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."). 
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self to the process voluntarily and the courts' general protections 
against harassment are sufficient. 
When the party seeks to go further and take discovery into the 
peer-review process, courts should follow two additional steps. First, 
limited document discovery, including document subpoenas, limited 
interrogatories, and similar methods, should be permitted, again 
under the same processes used for ordinary third-party discovery. 
The potential for intimidation and inconvenience is relatively small in 
this context and can be mitigated, as noted above, through indemnifi­
cation agreements. The identities of the peer reviewers, if previously 
anonymous, could be redacted at this stage in the process as well. 
If, upon the completion of this limited document discovery, the 
party wishes to take the depositions of individuals not involved di­
rectly in the litigation or to take further document discovery, includ­
ing seeking the names of the reviewers, the court should require a 
showing that the party has a reasonable basis to suspect that such 
discovery will be pertinent to the litigation. Such a showing might 
include a showing that the reviewer was not informed about the fact 
that the author was paid by attorneys involved in the litigation (if the 
scholarship is litigation-related), an indication to suspect that the re­
viewer was either lax or not disinterested, or other arguments that the 
process did not work as expected, such that the court should discount 
or disregard the peer-review factor under Daubert. In the event that 
the party opposing discovery can show a need, courts could use protec­
tive orders to maintain the anonymity of the reviewers, at least for the 
time being. 
As part of this evaluative process, a court may find it beneficial to 
have an expert who works for the court. 132 The expert could be chosen 
by agreement of the parties, with the party seeking discovery respon­
sible for his fees, and would be there essentially as a reality check for 
the judge. Thus, the expert might be a researcher from a local univer­
sity who could provide some perspective on whether the peer-review 
process in question deviated significantly from the ordinary process 
and whether a deposition was likely to provide something useful, 
rather than being harassment. 
If these safeguards are adopted with an eye to the potential harms 
they seek to prevent, researchers will be protected from unnecessary 
or harassing research, while parties will not have material evidence 
blocked from view. 
132. Cf William Schulz, JudgingScience, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Feb. 27, 
2006, at 36-39 (noting proposals for court-appointed experts). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence have, commendably, 
sought to incorporate more of the reliability criteria from science into 
courts' evaluation of expert testimony. This incorporation recognizes 
the overlapping magisteria of law and science. Law and science alike 
rely on testing and challenges to pursue reliable evidence-based con­
clusions. While the respective disciplines obviously have many differ­
ences, the bases on which they reach conclusions about the reliability 
of methodologies and conclusions are strikingly similar. 
These similarities have, as described above, led to both litigation-
driven scholarship and to efforts to take discovery into the process of 
obtaining publication in scientific literature, in particular the peer-re­
view process. These two phenomena should not be surprising in light 
of Daubertand, as I have argued above, should not be rejected as nec­
essarily negative for either law or science. 
Litigation-driven scholarship, while subject to many caveats, is not 
necessarily any less trustworthy than scholarship driven by those who 
fund it, whether that means pharmaceutical companies, government 
agencies, or universities spending discretionary grant money. The 
source of funding for studies, and the reasons for doing those studies 
in the first place, are all considered relevant but not dispositive in 
other contexts. No reason exists to treat the litigation relation of 
scholarship differently. 
Discovery into peer review has the potential to strengthen both law 
and science. As for strengthening law, judges will better understand 
the peer-review process once they have seen the results of this discov­
ery, and will understand the truly complex and varied activities that 
all fall within the umbrella term "peer review." More importantly, the 
information received through that discovery is directly relevant to the 
Daubert evaluation and will better filter expert testimony. As for 
what science gets out of it, the possibility, even remote, of litigation 
discovery will creative incentives for authors and reviewers to be care­
ful, especially when they are authoring or reviewing litigation-driven 
scholarship (where such discovery is most likely). 
Allowing for the cross-fertilization of law and science in this con­
text, then, will help both and, if appropriate protective measures are 
used, will hurt neither. As in all aspects of litigation, courts must be 
vigilant to avoid harassment or intimidation, especially with the addi­
tional concerns of academic freedom. But those concerns are not so 
great as to justify denying access to highly relevant materials. Simi­
larly, concerns about the biases inherent in litigation-driven scholar­
ship are not so great as to justify ignoring potentially important 
scholarship. With proper care, the overlapping magisteria of law and 
science can provide additional support for each other. 
